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Abstract: Matthew Liao’s edited collection Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of 
Morality covers a wide range of issues in moral psychology. The collection 
should be of interest to philosophers, psychologist, and neuroscientists alike, 
particularly those interested in the relation between these disciplines. I give an 
overview of the content and major themes of the volume and draw some 
important lessons about the connection between moral neuroscience and 
normative ethics. In particular, I argue that moving beyond some of the 
dichotomies implicit in some of the debates advanced in the book makes the 
neuroscience of moral judgments much more useful in advancing normative 
ethics. 
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Recent theoretical and empirical research in the psychological sciences has significantly 
advanced our understanding of moral thinking. In this changing landscape, Moral Brains: the 
neuroscience of morality does a great job at featuring leading researchers in moral cognition 
from a wide range of disciplines and summarizing the last two decades or so of scientific and 
philosophical discussion in moral cognition. This is an especially appealing book for researchers 
working on moral judgments, emotions and reasoning, moral decision-making and epistemology, 
personality disorders associated with impaired moral judgment, and the neuromodulation of 
moral thinking. Researchers with a broad interest in moral psychology, philosophy of 
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psychology, normative ethics, and metaethics will also find the book valuable. The volume 
supplies a collection of readings in moral psychology and neuroscience that works well as an 
introduction for advanced undergraduates and graduate students, as well as a stimulating reading 
for experienced researchers interested in the connection between moral psychology and the life 
sciences broadly construed. 
Like most collections, Moral Brains explores a wide range of topics without a clear 
unifying theme. However, a recurrent thread running through the book concerns the relation 
between the neuroscience of moral judgments and normative ethics and, in particular, the 
implications of the former for the latter. In what follows, I will give an overview of the content 
and major themes of the volume and draw some important lessons from it. I will argue that 
moving beyond some of the implicit dichotomies that permeate some of the chapters of the book 
may actually help research in moral neuroscience to advance normative ethics. 
 
1. Overview of the chapters 
 
The book begins with a helpful overview by Matthew Liao (editor and contributor to this 
volume) of the main issues discussed in the fourteen articles featured in the book. The chapters 
are divided into four parts, which are quite variable in focus, content, and methodology. The first 
part focuses on the role of emotions and reasoning in moral judgments, and how these different 
aspects of cognition can be eventually integrated into human moral thought. The second part 
discusses the reliability of deontological versus consequentialist judgments, focusing on the most 
recent version of Joshua Greene’s dual-process theory of moral judgment. The third part presents 
new findings and methods on the neuroscience of moral judgments, emphasizing the importance 
of clinical, pharmacological, and model organisms in the study of moral cognition. The fourth 
part deals with fundamental theoretical issues that overlap with many of the debates addressed in 
the book. 
In the first part of the volume, on the role of emotions and reasoning in moral judgments, 
Jesse Prinz claims that there are philosophical reasons and behavioral evidence to support a 
version of moral sentimentalism according to which emotions are a constitutive part of sincere 
moral judgments. Since the model is considered compatible with most of the empirical evidence 
in moral neuroscience, Prinz argues that this version of moral sentimentalism can help us to 
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understand how different brain structures contribute to moral cognition. Jeanette Kennett and 
Philip Gerrans do not necessarily disagree with Prinz’s constitutive model of moral judgments 
but they advocate in their contribution for a much broader role of reasoning in moral 
deliberation. Their model contrasts with that of moral intuitionist according to which moral 
judgments are the result of tacit affective processes that are partially encapsulated from explicit 
reasoning (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). In Kennett and Gerrans’ model, reasoning 
plays a major role in moral decision-making once the diachronic aspects of human agency are 
taken into consideration—e.g., the fact that an agent has to resolve long-term conflicts between 
opposing intuitive moral responses or deal with conflicting moral responses from different 
agents. 
Perhaps the most compelling contribution in this section is that by James Woodward who 
explicitly rejects a sharp distinction between human cognitive and affective pathways to moral 
judgment. According to Woodward, areas commonly identified as involved in emotional 
processing contribute causally to the construction of moral judgments in neurotypical subjects. 
Brain areas such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
anterior cingulate cortex, insula, amygdala, and the ventral striatum are involved in emotional 
processing. What these brain regions do is computing values associated with (positive and 
negative) reinforcers and the actions undertaken to provide those reinforcers. The computation of 
these values is essential for all kinds of decision-making because, otherwise, agents’ choices 
would not be motivating. Among these structures, the vmPFC and the OFC integrate reward 
signals from different stimuli and representations from cognitive systems (Rolls, 2005). Since 
empirical evidence shows that moral judgments in neurotypical subjects are often causally 
influenced by value signals in the vmPFC and the OFC (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2004; Shenhav & Greene, 2010), areas commonly identified as involved in emotional 
processing would play a central role in moral judgment in neurotypical subjects regardless of 
whether moral judgments and choices are in fact supported by reasoning or effortful thinking. 
Moreover, this would mean that we cannot make a sharp distinction between cognitive and 
affective pathways to moral judgments in neurotypical subjects and that the moral judgments of 
this population would be ‘sincere’ in the sense of being intrinsically motivating. 
The second part is arguably the heart of the book. A great deal of it is dedicated to 
discussing different aspects of Greene’s dual-process theory of moral judgment and the second 
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part specifically focuses on his most recent formulation (Greene, 2014), which is reprinted in this 
volume. In this contribution, Greene proposes two routes through which neuroscience research 
could have implications for normative ethics. In the direct route, independent normative 
assumptions are combined with neuroscientific research about the factors that our moral 
judgments are sensitive to. In the indirect route, neuroscientific research identifies the conditions 
under which automatic and effortful moral judgments are more cognitively efficient. 
Greene’s central argument focuses on the indirect route. He argues that current 
neuroscientific research favors a certain form of consequentialism. Drawing upon an analogy 
with digital SLR cameras, Greene maintains that human moral cognition operates in two 
complementary modes: a set of automatic settings and an effortful, general-purpose reasoning 
mode. According to him, we should not rely on our automatic moral settings when attempting to 
resolve moral problems with which we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal 
experience (or as Greene calls them ‘unfamiliar’ moral problems) since it would be a cognitive 
miracle if we turn out to have reliable good moral instincts under these conditions (p. 131). So 
effortful thinking is best suited for dealing with this class of moral problems. This has important 
consequences for normative ethics, for Greene maintains that automatic emotional responses 
typically support characteristically deontological judgments, while processes of effortful thinking 
typically support characteristically consequentialist ones. As defined in this chapter, the former 
are judgments that are naturally justified by appeals to rights, duties, and so on, whereas the 
latter are those that are naturally justified in terms of cost-benefit reasoning (p. 122). As a result, 
Greene concludes that characteristically consequentialist judgments are best suited for dealing 
with moral problems with which we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal 
experience. 
This part of the book includes two comments by Julia Driver and Stephen Darwall as 
well as a reply to these comments by Greene. Driver is a long-standing advocate of 
consequentialist views in moral philosophy. She argues that consequentialist and deontological 
moral theories are in general immune to Greene’s argument because the debate about whether 
moral deliberation is more reliable in consequentialist than deontological terms requires 
assuming a background moral theory that allows us to determine whether subjects’ responses are 
morally correct or not. Darwall, in contrast, is a well-known expert on deontological approaches 
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to ethics. He points out that arguing that consequentialist moral theories are more reliable than 
deontological ones implies claiming that consequentialism is a better theory of moral right. 
Darwall’s argument requires some attention. He begins emphasizing that Greene aims to 
support a particular form of consequentialism, namely act-consequentialism. According to act-
consequentialists, an action is morally right if and only if that action yield the best available 
consequences, regardless of whether it would be best for us to be disposed to act upon non-
consequentialist moral intuitions in order to bring about those consequences. This makes act-
consequentialism an ‘esoteric’ moral theory (Williams, 1995, p. 165). For example, people could 
not be reasonably held accountable for acting upon those moral intuitions which best dispose 
them to bring about these consequences, even in situations in which those actions actually do not 
meet the act-consequentialist standards of a morally right action. This makes the notions of 
moral right and moral accountability conceptually independent of each other. But Darwall argues 
that the notions of moral right and wrong are tied conceptually to the idea of moral responsibility 
or accountability in the sense that if an action is wrong, then it is of a kind that is blameworthy 
unless the agent has an excuse (p. 167). Thus, he claims that on conceptual grounds, there are 
superior theories of moral right, including some versions of rule-consequentialism. A better 
account, for instance, would be one in which an agent is obligated to perform actions of which it 
is true that the general acceptance of a rule requiring those actions would have better 
consequences than would the general acceptance of any other rule in similar circumstances. 
Darwall himself does not endorse this form of consequentialism. Yet, he exemplifies with this 
his key conceptual claim without making non-consequentialist assumptions. For unlike act-
consequentialism, this form of rule-consequentialism would make the notion of moral right 
conceptually tied to that of accountability. Since such a version of rule-consequentialism does 
lead to characteristically deontological judgments, we should not conclude that characteristically 
consequentialist judgments are more reliable than characteristically deontological ones. 
In response to Driver, Greene’s reply proceeds in terms of both the direct and the indirect 
route. I will focus only on the latter since Driver main argument focuses on the role of 
background moral theorizing in Greene’s argument but the direct route relies on independent 
normative assumptions to reach substantive moral conclusions. So Greene’s argument seems to 
be stronger when framed in terms of the indirect route than when framed in terms of direct route. 
According to the former, we should not rely on our automatic moral settings when attempting to 
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resolve moral problems with which we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal 
experience because this would amount to expecting a cognitive miracle. Greene argues that no 
additional normative premise is required to support this claim since such a claim is true 
regardless of the standard we apply for determining reliability. To illustrate this, he considers the 
case of novice drivers who lack personal experience behind the wheel since it would be a 
cognitive miracle if they succeed in their first attempt at driving a car. Finally, Greene clarifies 
that he understands consequentialism not only as a decision procedure for unfamiliar moral 
problems but as a higher-order ‘metamoral’ standard, i.e., a normative standard that adjudicates 
among competing tribal values and interests (p. 175). Thus, he thinks that there is a standard for 
everyday cases and a standard for hard cases that is the same, even though the decision 
procedure changes depending on the nature of the decision problem. 
In response to Darwall, Greene agrees with Darwall that act-consequentialism is unfit for 
directly guiding everyday moral behavior, but he denies that this entails that act-
consequentialism is ‘interpersonally’ esoteric since people do have access to the foundational 
moral standards upheld by act-consequentialists. Moreover, Greene argues that since 
consequentialism is only a good normative guide for dealing with difficult moral problems, his 
argument does not entail the complete rejection of characteristically deontological judgments. 
Therefore, it is not a problem if the dictates of rule-consequentialism are characteristically 
deontological since the kind of metamoral theory he defends would accommodate both 
characteristically consequentialist judgments and characteristically deontological judgments. 
Overall, Greene’s responses seem to dodge the objections raised by Driver and Darwall. 
Assuming that we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience to solve a 
moral problem is in itself a moral assumption, which means that his main argument proceeds 
through Greene’s direct, rather than indirect, route, and therefore it requires some background 
moral theorizing. Take the case of driving a car. According to Greene, this example only works 
within the range of plausible conceptions of good driving: “Of course, if by driving “well” you 
mean crashing immediately into a tree, then all bets are off. But within the range of plausible 
conceptions of good driving, we can say with confidence that new drivers cannot drive well 
based on automatic responses (intuition) and must instead rely on explicit, controlled decision-
making” (p. 173). By parity of reasoning, this would hold true in the moral case only within the 
range of plausible conceptions of what making good moral judgments is. The problem would 
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then be that determining this set of plausible conceptions seems to require moral theorizing. 
Even assuming that automatic moral responses are unreliable in situations in which we have 
inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience, we still require background moral 
theorizing. For we should not rely on our automatic moral settings only if (or to the extent that) 
we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience to solve a moral problem. 
However, assuming that we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience to 
solve a moral problem is a moral assumption. Since we need background moral theorizing to 
determine when (or to what extent) we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal moral 
experience, then the argument would still require background moral theorizing to support the 
assumption. 
Greene also seems to overlook Darwall’s key conceptual claim about the relation 
between the notions of moral right and moral accountability. If act-consequentialism is unfit for 
directly guiding everyday moral behavior as he agrees, then people cannot be held accountable 
on an everyday basis for following a different policy or acting in ways that do not meet act-
consequentialist standards. Therefore, even if the kind of metamoral theory Greene defends 
encompasses characteristically consequentialist judgments and characteristically deontological 
judgments, his argument still would not fully support consequentialism construed as a theory of 
moral right to the extent that it does not address Darwall’s key conceptual concern about the 
connection between the notions of moral right and moral accountability. 
The third part of the book is perhaps the most attractive for those readers engaged in 
methodological issues around moral neuroscience. In their contribution, James Blair, Soonjo 
Hwang, Stuart White, and Harma Meffert defend an integrated emotion systems model of 
psychopathy, which aims to understand the functional properties of the neural systems involved 
in psychopathic traits and the computational implications of their dysfunction (Blair, 2007). They 
argue that emotional systems allow norms to acquire their prohibitive power by guiding our 
attitudes toward these norms and their violation. In the next chapter, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, 
Roland Zahn, and Jorge Moll focus on developmental psychopathy and acquired sociopathy. 
Their goal is reviewing and extending previous attempts to infer the neural underpinnings of 
moral cognition through research on normal and abnormal moral behavior. From a 
methodological point of view, they integrate information from functional neuroimaging on 
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normal subjects as well as lesion studies on psychopaths and subjects with antisocial personality 
and conduct disorders either in vivo or through postmortem exam. 
My highlights of this part of the book are Molly Crockett’s and Jana Schaich Borg’s 
contributions. On the one hand, Crockett’s chapter focuses on the influences of the 
neuromodulator serotonin on moral judgment and behavior. The evidence reviewed in this 
chapter reveals, for instance, that pharmacological enhancement of serotonin function increases 
people’s aversion to harmful actions, and thus makes people less likely to judge harmful actions 
as morally permissible in hypothetical scenarios. Similarly, increased levels of serotonin have 
been shown to reduce people’s willingness to inflict financial harm on others in retaliation for 
unfair treatment in ultimatum games. Since there seem to be no healthy levels of serotonin, and it 
is currently impossible to determine a baseline physiological state from which we can generate 
reliable moral judgments, Crocket argues that the influence of serotonin could have important 
normative implications, as moral judgments would be sensitive to non-normative factors that are 
significantly variable. In other words, these results warn us about potential noise introduced by 
serotonin function at the implementation level of moral judgment and decision-making. 
On the other hand, Schaich Borg’s chapter discusses the relevance of rodent models of 
negative intersubjectivity in the study of moral behavior and cognition. Roughly speaking, 
negative intersubjectivity is the process of disliking or feeling negative (for whatever reason, 
selfish or not) when another individual feels bad (p. 248). Schaich Borg argues that a central 
reason to pursue this avenue of research is that negative intersubjectivity is an important 
regulatory mechanism of immoral action as shown in studies on the affective components of 
empathy and research on callous personality traits. Another reason is that neuroscience tools 
available in humans such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have poor temporal 
and spatial resolution to study the type of processes we believe are responsible for moral 
cognition and behavior. The question is, of course, whether rodent models are actual models of 
moral cognition, but Schaich Borg argues that rodent models should be complemented by similar 
tests in humans for validation and comparison. This emphasis on the role of comparative 
psychology in the study of moral behavior and cognition is particularly welcome since the study 
of non-human animal cognition connects research in the psychological sciences to the 
phylogenetic history, adaptive significance, and ontogeny of behavior and cognition. By focusing 
on moral action, Schaich Borg’s contribution also reminds us of the risk of over-intellectualized 
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views of moral cognition that have limited practical implications. Although understanding moral 
judgment might be philosophically deep and genuinely important, so is understanding why bad, 
overly aggressive behavior happens. In this context, non-human models of empathy and 
aggression control can be enlightening, even if they are cognitively impoverished under some 
reasonable anthropocentric standard. 
In the final part of the book, Guy Kahane argues that the most interesting arguments that 
allow drawing interesting normative conclusions are epistemic in nature, i.e., arguments in which 
the causal origins of our beliefs affect their justification (pp. 290-291). Since the epistemic status 
of moral beliefs will frequently depend on whether their distal, as opposed to proximal, causes 
are reliable sources of moral evaluations, findings on the neural mechanisms of moral cognition 
will play only a minor role in such arguments. In the following chapter, Matthew Liao argues 
that heuristics involve a form of reasoning, regardless of whether one understands heuristics as 
an attribute substitution process (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & 
Cushman, 2010) or as a fast-and-frugal algorithm (Gigerenzer, 2008). Given that intuitions entail 
forming conclusion-judgments not based on premise-judgments, they are different from 
reasoning, and thus different from heuristics understood either way. So, Liao argues, normative 
claims, such as those of Greene, that deontological intuitions tend to be inaccurate and unreliable 
like the automatic settings in a digital SLR camera would be unwarranted. In the closing chapter 
of this volume, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong draws heavily on his previous work (Parkinson et al., 
2011; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley, 2012, 2013) to argue that no 
single set of common and distinctive features of moral judgments that enables interesting 
psychological generalizations can unify them. Unification here means to be able to test which 
judgments are moral in order to reveal what it is that makes these judgments to be moral (p. 335). 
However, Sinnott-Armstrong argues that there are reasons to think that moral judgments are not 
unified in terms of their content, neural basis, and function—although Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) 
and Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley (2012, 2013) argue against other potential ways to unify 
moral judgments. This raises the question about what feature (or set of features) could possibly 
unify moral judgments in the sense specified above. As a result, he suggests a bottom-up 
methodological approach aimed to investigate more carefully defined subclasses of moral 






As previously mentioned, one of the central themes of the book is the implications of moral 
neuroscience for normative ethics. So, in this part of the review, I would like to reflect further on 
this issue. For one central feature of the book is that many of the contributions, especially from 
philosophers, often point out how little we can actually learn from this data—Prinz, Woodward, 
and Kahane are particularly explicit on this point. Most of the contributions indeed focus on 
traditional psychological methods. This is understandable since traditional psychological 
methods are semantic (in the sense of targeting mental states with content about the world), 
which seems more informative than mere data about, say, the formal computations of cognitive 
systems or how they are implemented in actual neural systems. One important exception is 
Crockett’s contribution since she focuses on how moral judgments respond to neuromodulators 
such as serotonin that are, in principle, morally inane and not clearly linked to morally relevant 
distal factors (see Kahane, pp. 294-295, in this volume for discussion). 
The claim I want to defend now closely follows that of Woodward in this volume, for I 
want to argue that moving away from certain dichotomies prevalent in, but not exclusive to, 
Greene’s dual process theory of moral judgments makes neuroscience much more useful in 
advancing normative ethics. More specifically, I want to challenge the following assumptions: 
first, the idea that either we rely on automatic moral settings or we rely on conscious reasoning, 
and second, the idea that either we have adequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience, 
or we have not. 
Rejecting these dichotomies makes easier to derive normative conclusions from premises 
about neuroscientific facts by focusing on the interaction between automatic settings and 
effortful thinking as well as on the coordination and integration of relevant disciplines beyond 
neuroscience such as evolutionary biology, cultural evolution, and developmental psychology. 
Even assuming that moral facts are natural facts, neuroscience alone cannot bridge the gap 
between premises about neuroscientific facts and the moral implications that we aim to derive 
from those facts. Moral judgments (understood as mental states) are just not reducible to facts 
about neural architecture, as Sinnott-Armstrong argues in this volume and elsewhere (Parkinson 
et al., 2011), and the causal connection between our neural organization and the relevant facts 
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that our moral judgments are supposed to track (whatever they are) does not seem 
reconstructable by neuroscientific research alone. 
Regarding the first dichotomy, it is not true that we rely on either one mode of cognition 
or the other since automatic settings and effortful thinking interact to influence moral 
judgment—Woodward makes a similar point in this volume with respect to the emotion/reason 
dichotomy. For example, effortful thinking can influence the prediction error upon which our 
automatic mode of cognition operates (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011). 
Similarly, automatic settings may provide estimates which we employ through effortful thinking 
when forced by computational complexity to prune its online evaluation of options (Crockett, 
2013). Furthermore, even if effortful thinking requires to override our default intuition and 
replace it by, say, conscious reasoning, the capacity to overrule intuitive responses is also a 
function of factors such as the metacognitive feeling of rightness in the initial response 
(Thompson, 2009; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). Hence, it is not true that we 
rely on either one mode of cognition or the other since we can rely on both automatic settings 
and effortful thinking. 
Relying on both modes of cognition can reduce computational noise. Computational 
noise can be defined as the chance variability of judgments due to the influence of irrelevant 
factors. The complex calculations associated with effortful thinking are often accurate but they 
are not immune to computational noise—e.g., time and stress pressure, limitations on attention, 
speed, the ability to multitask, and depletion of other cognitive resources. Similarly, there is also 
noise associated with incomplete and inefficient learning associated with our automatic settings. 
Information gathered through experience is always partial and learning from it requires 
significant time. Yet the interaction between automatic settings and effortful thinking can help to 
reduce the computational noise of each other. For instance, effortful thinking can train our 
automatic settings through offline simulation (Ji & Wilson, 2007), which reduces the exploratory 
risk and cost associated with prolonged reinforced learning in the latter. Since effortful thinking 
can influence the prediction error upon which the automatic settings are learned (Daw et al., 
2011), it can also reduce computational noise by speeding up learning. Moreover, automatic 
settings can help to reduce computational noise associated with effortful thinking by providing 
estimates which are used to prune the options that the latter evaluates (Crockett, 2013). 
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Less computational noise increases the computational robustness of the overall decision-
making system. Computational robustness is the ability of a computational system to maintain its 
functionality across a diverse array of operational conditions. In the context of moral decision-
making, it would mean something like making good moral choices in a wide range of 
circumstances. Reducing the chance variability of judgments due to the influence of irrelevant 
factors would consequently increase the chances of making good moral choices across a number 
of possible scenarios. Therefore, relying on both automatic settings and effortful thinking can 
increase the computational robustness of the overall decision-making system. 
Because relying on both systems can increase the computational robustness of our moral 
decision-making, we can investigate how to increase this form of robustness significantly more 
by looking at the interaction between both systems than by looking just at the relative robustness 
of each system independently. To put it another way, looking at the interaction between 
automatic settings and effortful thinking can help us to advance normative ethics significantly 
more than thinking of these systems separately, for the more we understand how to increase the 
computational robustness of moral decision-making, the more we can advance normative ethics. 
A deeper understanding of these interactions and their consequences for computational 
performance can help us, for instance, to find more robust moral principles and theories. 
Regarding the second dichotomy, if it were true that either we have adequate 
evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience to solve a moral problem, or we have not, then it 
should not be the case that sometimes we have partially adequate experience about morally 
relevant facts. But it is difficult to conceive a moral problem in which all our evolutionary, 
cultural, or personal experience turns totally inadequate. For example, we often have 
evolutionary, cultural, and personal experience about intentional facts that is relevant for moral 
evaluation. So, it is not true that either we have adequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal 
experience to solve a moral problem, or we have not, and thus we frequently have both adequate 
and inadequate experience to solve moral problems. 
This shows how we need to rely on normative ethics to tell us what facts are morally 
relevant and when we have gathered information about them through our evolutionary, cultural, 
or personal experience. The relevance of some of these facts could sometimes be controversial, 
but not always. Relying on uncontroversially relevant moral facts puts us on the safe side, as 
Greene remarks. But as Humeans repeatedly remind us, we cannot logically derive a conclusion 
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with explicitly moral content from premises without moral content—a claim that could be true 
even if moral predicates were synonymous with non-moral predicates (Pigden, 2010). This 
means that Driver is right to emphasize the background role of moral theorizing, contrary to 
Greene’s assumption (p. 171). Whatever the metaphysical status of those facts is, we need moral 
theorizing to shed light on what facts are morally relevant in a particular moral situation and 
whether they support our premises about the adequacy of our evolutionary, cultural, or personal 
experience. 
Moreover, we would need facts about our evolutionary, cultural, and developmental 
history that connect facts about our neural wiring with morally relevant facts. That is, we would 
need to rely not only on facts about our internal wiring on the one hand and on normative ethics 
to pinpoint morally relevant facts on the other but also on connection facts that link these two. 
Connection facts are facts about how our internal organization registers and tracks external 
circumstances. Considerations about these connection facts allow us to assess the reliability of 
our inner neural wiring to track those morally relevant facts—this tracking cannot just be a 
matter of luck as if we took moral decisions by throwing a dice (see Kahane, p. 294, in this 
volume). The life sciences can contribute much to this project because understanding the 
connection between cognitive machinery and relevant moral facts requires explaining how such 
machinery evolved, how it develops, and how it relates to our environment under ecological 
conditions that we often engineered through our cultural practices and which affect cognitive 
performance. Since we need facts about our evolutionary, cultural, and developmental history 
that connect facts about our neural wiring with morally relevant facts, then we need to integrate 
research on the life sciences more broadly (including the study of cultural evolution) for moral 
neuroscience to advance normative ethics. 
This point is nicely illustrated by Driver’s question on whether it may also be considered 
a cognitive miracle that moral judgments track moral truth at all, to which Greene replies that, in 
his understanding of cognitive evolution, it is generally adaptive to have true beliefs. Yet this 
line of reply makes too many assumptions about the evolutionary link between cognition and 
moral truth. Perhaps having mental states that track facts about our environment is adaptive but it 
is less clear why these mental states have to be belief-like. Perhaps having belief-like mental 
states that track facts about our environment is adaptive but it is less clear why those facts have 
to be moral. Perhaps having belief-like mental states that track moral facts is adaptive but it is 
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less clear why this was so in the hominin lineage—we still need an evolutionary story about how 
having belief-like mental states that track morally relevant facts (assuming that those facts exist) 
was indeed fitness-enhancing. Moreover, even if having true beliefs were always adaptive, it 
does not follow from that that all adaptations (cognitive or not) are traits for having true beliefs. 
Systems involved in moral cognition can be adaptations, although not necessarily adaptations for 
tracking moral facts—e.g., cognitive mechanisms for language can be adaptations for solving 
coordination problems between multiple agents rather than adaptations for tracking 
environmental facts. 
To sum up, Moral Brains explores a wide range of issues in moral psychology, even if 
still too attached to traditional debates such as the role of emotions and reasoning in moral 
cognition or the reliability of deontological versus consequentialist moral thinking. The title of 
the book might be indeed somewhat deceiving since not all chapters engage with actual 
neuroscience and not all of them with the same breadth and depth. Yet this is a rather enjoyable 
feature of the book and certainly an essential part of its take-home message. For bridging the 
gaps between neuroscientific facts and moral philosophy is an integrative enterprise, which 
requires a more detailed understanding of how we relate as organisms to our environments. 
Moral neuroscience is not, after all, reducible to mere neuroscience. 
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